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Feature Essay
Winter 2015
Phillips, Christopher CIVIL WAR SESQUICENTENNIAL: Unfurling the Black
Flag in Civil War History.
Fifteen years have passed since Daniel E. Sutherland unfurled the black flag
and declared the guerrilla conflict in the Civil War a “sideshow no longer." Long
seen as a product of aberrant individualism, a legacy of frontier conflicts, or a
facet of southern cultural violence (interpretive tropes popularized by Michael
Fellman in his seminal Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During
the American Civil War, published in 1989), Sutherland argued that this
“desperate side of the Civil War," as he aptly termed guerrilla warfare, was in
fact a central element. Widespread irregular warfare deeply affected federal
policy and strategy, and when federal troops waged a destructive and retaliatory
war against southern civilians in order to break their will to fight, it debilitated
the Confederate war effort and contributed to defeat.
That the word guerrilla translates to “small war" is only the most obvious of
the ironies surrounding the internecine warfare that the war produced even in its
earliest days. Guerrilla warfare did not begin with the Confederacy’s Partisan
Ranger Act, passed on April 21, 1862. Independent irregular bands had roamed
in parts of the nation for nearly a year, especially Missouri, western Virginia, and
eastern Tennessee. Indeed, the pervasive fear of marauding parties" from
neighboring slave states, real as well as imagined, had driven unionists in many
free states to organize border patrols and home guards with the sanction of their
anxious state legislatures. Some crossed state lines or rivers and acted the part of
bushwhackers as much as the gangs they sought. Retaliatory warfare soon
followed. In the war’s first months, night riders stole horses and saboteurs
destroyed railroads, trestles, and bridges. Soon enough, they attacked other
symbols of federal authority, including banks, trains, riverboats, and
stagecoaches, and frequently interrupted mail, fired at boats, or derailed trains
while women and children were aboard.
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Sutherland’s contention that guerrilla war was in fact a mainstream form of
Civil War-making was soon aided by current events in the form of the Iraq and
Afghanistan conflicts, with grisly images of beheadings, IEDs, ambushes, and
suicide bombings, shaking the public’s sensibilities about honorable warfare and
warriors in this new age of terrorism. The 2009 publication of his A Savage
Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War brought
recognition in the form of major awards and the sideshow’s move to the Big
Top.
As Sutherland moved pro-Confederate guerrillas from the war’s interpretive
side tent, he rescued them from the realm of fawning biographies, which
commenced nearly as the war ended. Painting their subjects as chivalrous
southern defenders of home and hearth, these portrayals allowed for a strict, and
ultimately partisanized, separation of guerrillas (or the more pejorative
bushwhackers or brigands) from partisans and cavalry raiders. Such
categorization aided the romantic southernization of such commanders as John
Hunt Morgan, John Mosby (taken up in historian James A. Ramage’s
biographical treatments of both), M. Jeff Thompson, Joseph O. Shelby, and
especially William C. Quantrill. Military professionals such as Robert R.
Mackey swooped into the void, using post-Vietnam command school
terminology to create categories for the wide array of irregular combatants.
Mackey’s The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865,
published in 2005 just before Sutherland’s book, offered a too-strict typology of
the various fighters who warred outside the formal ranks. Ironically, he conflated
most pro-Confederate irregulars as terrorists and brigands. Sutherland allowed
more flexibility in his categories, but maintained something of a hard line
between regular, meaning Confederate and federal cavalry, and irregular
fighters.
But those lines were always blurred, and partisan. Even as the war unfolded, 
imprecision assisted with the politicization of the shadow warriors who 
bedeviled federal and state troops especially in the Border States and Upper 
South, shading the lines between regular and irregular warfare, guerrillas and 
cavalry. Wartime unionists indiscriminately referred to armed men roaming the 
roads—whether draft dodgers, partisans, outlaws, or farmers—as guerrillas. All 
were seen as potential threats. The Shakers at South Union, Kentucky, expanded 
the term to include armed Confederates generally, and southern sympathizers 
claimed them as a modern incarnation of partisans, who had helped to win an 
earlier war of independence, thus applying the term to the newest home-front
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heroes. Even as some of them threatened to burn her home, pro-Confederate
Missourian Elvira A. W. Scott characterized bushwhackers as good-looking,
polite, and intelligent . . . the best and bravest of the land, who have been
wronged and outraged beyond endurance and have resolved to avenge their
wrongs. Unionists like Kentuckian George D. Prentice, the irascible editor of the
Louisville Journal and by 1863 a harsh critic of Lincoln, ridiculed such
hair-splitting, condemning John Hunt Morgan as a guerrilla for attacking
disguised in federal uniforms under flags of truce, common ruses in neighboring
Missouri and Tennessee.
Guerrillas might have been the most feared purveyors of political violence,
but they were only one of many interest groups to traffic in it. The violence that
emerged from these “everyday forms of ideological struggle," as scholar James
C. Scott has written of more recent conflicts, were expressions of a pervasive,
mature home-front insurgency often hidden from view. Guerrillas sought more
than simple security; they fought for wartime power and advantage by waging
shadowy conflicts that took various forms and produced many targets of
opportunity.
If the current spate of interest in (and scholarship on) Civil War guerrillas
derives in some part from seeking explanation for the “just" wars waged by
Islamic jihadists in the Middle East and central Asia, central components of the
long “war on terror," these works mostly lack ideological explanations of
guerrillas’ motivations. Indeed, war-weary Americans have become aware of
modern insurgents’ keen reckoning of benchmark dates, using them to initiate
new violence for partisan effect. Likely not coincidentally, Jo Shelby’s “Great
Raid" into Missouri commenced on September 22, 1863, the one-year
anniversary of Abraham Lincoln’s announcement of his Preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation. That it commenced barely a month after the brutal
attack on Lawrence, Kansas, by William Quantrill’s band, itself a response to
federal general Thomas Ewing’s infamous Order No. 11 that depopulated nearly
four Missouri counties in order to undercut the guerrillas’ “domestic supply
line," as historian LeeAnn Whites characterizes homefront women's support of
guerillas, by making war on disloyal civilians, confirms the western dimension
of the now-accepted trajectory toward a much harder war. That the Raid was
conceived and commanded by the reputed wealthiest man in his border state—a
Missouri hemp planter and rope manufacturer whose home county, Lafayette,
was among the state’s largest slaveowning counties and whose family owned
collectively nearly 150 slaves and who, during the Missouri-Kansas Border War,
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led two forays of proslavery activists into the territory and participated in 1856
in the prior sack of Lawrence, for proslavery western Missourians the self-styled
abolitionist capital—suggests an ideological as much as strategic motive for the
Raid.
The ideological foundations for guerrilla warfare bore early fruit in
Missouri, showing even as the war commenced. As Mark W. Geiger found in his
innovative Financial Fraud and Guerrilla Violence in Missouri’s Civil War,
1861-1965 (2010), material realities were entwined with guerrilla proclivities.
Pro-Confederate Missourians hailed disproportionately from the upper strata of
rural society, and had for years been engaging in for-profit commercial
agriculture reliant on slave labor. They invested heavily in railroad construction
during the 1850s, became deeply indebted to local bankers, and when federal and
state authorities took over the banks in late 1861, many saw their farms and
slaves auctioned, denying sons their economic and cultural inheritances. Many
responded not by enlisting in the Confederate service, but by becoming
irregulars who would wage war on those who had robbed them. In the Boon’s
Lick, four-fifths of identified “bushwhackers" came from indebted families
whose property was sold in the estate sales. The families of guerrillas in one
western Missouri county were three times as likely to have owned slaves and
were twice as likely to have possessed real wealth, including slaves, as an
average white male Missourian. As guerrillas, these slaveholding scions thus
made common violent cause with desperate men from the bottom of their
society. Not surprisingly, counties that suffered the greatest frequency of
guerrilla violence over the course of the war also had the greatest incidence of
these bank foreclosures.
That slavery and emancipation provided a fulcrum for ideological warriors 
on both sides finds its strongest voice in John Fabian Witt’s serial prize-winning 
Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History (2012). The rapid 
expansion of guerrilla warfare in 1862 and the many and varied irregular fighters 
plaguing the war effort from behind the lines drew Francis W. Lieber, a 
published expert on international laws of war then lecturing at Columbia 
University, to offer a legal framework for combating them. A former slaveholder 
turned abolitionist, Lieber traveled to Virginia and met with Benjamin Butler, 
who famously refused to return slave “contrabands," before setting to work. The 
essay he produced emphasized the centrality of slavery to the war effort and 
condemned most irregulars as outlaws who should be denied rights as legitimate 
soldiers. At Henry W. Halleck’s invitation, Lieber headed a war department
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committee that fashioned carefully ranked categories of irregular combatants by
which to assign appropriate punishments. Lieber established limits to wartime
behaviors of armies and governments, especially to retaliatory targeting of black
soldiers and their white officers, while advocating “the more elastic limit of
military necessity" to respond to guerrilla warfare. He included the term
“guerrilla" among such terms as “robbers, pirates, armed prowlers, and
war-rebels," in effect it classified all irregulars as outside the “laws of warfare"
and denying them the rights of legitimate soldiers. Calling for the military’s
restraint in administering punishment, he subjected civilians to it who aided
guerrillas, including women. In April 1863, Lincoln approved what was issued
as General Orders No. 100, known since as the Lieber Code, defining as military
necessity all measures indispensable for securing the ends of the war." The order
provided constitutional sanction to many of the Lincoln government s recent
initiatives—martial law, suspension of habeas corpus, confiscation of the
property of the disloyal, and emancipation—as well as allowing for capital and
summary punishment of guerrillas. Lieber’s expanded vision of military
necessity had a political complement. Delivering a jeremiad to New York s
Loyal League entitled “No Party Now But All for Our Country, he offered
Republicans an exclusivist blueprint for all-or-nothing patriotism against
home-front dissenters. For Lieber, the genesis of his Code, and for guerrilla or
other partisan warfare, was slavery.
Breaking the mold for sympathetic biographies of pro-Confederate irregular 
fighters, and blending the ideological guerrilla war with its postwar legacy, T. J. 
Stiles’s Jesse James: The Last Rebel of the Civil War (2002) offers the most 
thorough treatment of a guerrilla as both terrorist and cold warrior. With lively 
narrative supported by exhaustive research, Stiles argues persuasively that James 
was a jihadist of a different kind, both wartime and postwar. No social bandit, to 
use historian Eric Hobsbawm’s phrase, or a Robin Hood who robbed from the 
rich and gave to the poor, as popular lore has him, James fought as a guerrilla in 
the war to defend his family and his home by preserving its way of life in one of 
Missouri’s most slave-rich counties. After the war, he combined political 
violence with ordinary crime, fighting former unionists and the federal 
government’s efforts at Reconstruction—or the form it took in Missouri where it 
was not mandated, nearly as did the Ku Kluxers there and in the former 
Confederacy. Opposition to wartime emancipation expressed as racial violence 
was a central pillar of the temple of guerrilla warfare, and extended fully into the 
postwar, as Aaron Astor argues well in Rebels on the Border: Civil War,
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Emancipation, and the Reconstruction of Kentucky and Missouri (2012). Among
them were James and his gang members and innumerable other former guerrillas
who intimidated free blacks, terrorized Radical voters and candidates, and
publicized their views and actions as extensions of Confederate policies. (James
did so by way of Kansas City journalist and former Confederate officer John
Newman Edwards. Edwards, who historian Matthew C. Hulbert argues took the
lead in constructing an “irregular memory" of the war for the state’s angry
former Confederate sympathizing electorate, gave James a platform not only to
justify his robberies of trains and banks but to attack Republican-led
Reconstruction throughout postwar America.)
As recent scholarship makes clear, once military necessity included
slavery’s destruction, irregular violence became a medium of social exchange
and ideological litmus of political warfare. Although this violence was prevalent
in all the region’s states, the degree of violence was highest in those states where
slavery existed and especially once black enlistment was underway in all states.
Emancipation fully entwined political and military goals, and common people
resisted what they considered an illegitimate social revolution with what means
they had. Among them was violence, of which guerrilla warfare might have been
a weapon of the weak but offered a position of strength that affected the
trajectory of the war and its political aftermath. No longer a sideshow, the
guerrilla conflict is now in the center ring of Civil War scholarship.
Christopher Phillips, University of Cincinnati
The author of seven books on the Civil War era, Phillips’s newest book, The
Rivers Ran Backward: The Civil War on the Middle Border and the Making of
American Regionalism, will be published by Oxford University Press in the fall
of 2015.
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